文章摘要
约根森难题与真值语义学
Jrgensens Dilemma and Truth-value Semantics
  
DOI:
中文关键词: 约根森难题  道义推理  逻辑有效性  逻辑后承
英文关键词: Jrgensen dilemma  deontic inference  logical validity  logical consequence
基金项目:中国人民大学科学研究基金课题(10XNJ022)
作者单位
王 天 楠 中国政法大学 政治与公共管理学院,北京 100088 
摘要点击次数: 2409
全文下载次数: 569
中文摘要:
      约根森难题意味着,一方面规范语句不能作为逻辑推理的前提或结论;而 另外一方面,很多包含规范语句的道义推理在直觉上是正确的。真值语义学试图通过假定规范语句可以有真假来评价道义推理的有效性。这种方案的问题在于它没有解决这个难题,而是绕过了它。约根森难题的解决需要一种比真值语义学更为一般的逻辑后承概念,它否认逻辑必须依赖于真概念。
英文摘要:
      Jrgensens dilemma means that ought-sentences cannot play a role as the premise or conclusion of a logical inference, for they are unable to be true or false, on one hand; and many inferences taking ought- sentences as premise or conclusion are intuitively correct on the other hand. The truth-value semantic solutions try to evaluate the validity of the deontic inferences, by supposing that ought-sentences can also be true or false. These solutions do not remove the dilemma but only circumvent it. A more general concept of logical consequence than the truth-value semantic one should be needed for solving the Jrgensen dilemma, which denies that logic must depend on the concept of truth.
查看全文   查看/发表评论  下载PDF阅读器
关闭