In recent years,Hunan has made significant achievements in comprehensive treatment of the Xiangjiang River’s water pollution.However,the implementation of the plan for polluting enterprises’ treatment and withdrawal is not good,and serious environmental pollution incidents have still appeared constantly.In view of this,from the standpoint of complete information static games,this paper builds game pay-off matrixes between local government and polluting enterprises,the third-party and polluting enterprises,local government and polluting enterprises with higher-level government,and analyzes different equalizations.It finds that local government often chooses to compromise with polluting enterprises,and the imperfect environmental damage compensation system directly results in the third-party’s difficulty to join in environment supervision,the defect of compensation mechanism causes inadequate polluting enterprises treatment and withdrawal,and strict supervision from higher-level government is the key point to crack the collusion between local government and polluting enterprises.Lastly,this paper puts forward countermeasures to these problems.